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I14TRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The activities of the Aerospace Safety Advsiory Panel (ASAP)
accelerated in 1952 to support the increased flight rate of the
Space Trahsportation System (STS) and the assessment of data
being acquired on the actual flight experience with the various
subsystems. Approximately forty meetings took place involving
NASA personnel, NASA contractors and members of the ASAP. The
meetings included visits to all NASA centers directly , involved ifi
the flight hardware and its launching and testing, as well as
contractor ta,cilities. Appendix I contains a list of visits for
1982 along with subjects covered during both the individual
visits and the complete Panel discussions.
During the year the Panel membership was augmented by the
appointment of Gerald W. Elverum, Jr., Vice President and General
Manager of the Applied Technology Division of the TRW Space and
Technology Group. The purpose of this appointment was to augment
the Panel's knowledge of propulsion systems needed because of Dr.
Seymour C. Himmel's completion of his six-year term and the
signal importance of these systems to Shuttle and payload safety.
Because of Dr. Himmel's familiarity with the entire Shuttle
development, he has been retained as a consultant.
In addition to Gerald Elverum's appointment, the Panel has
added Robert D. Rothi, Chiet Design Engineer of the Douglas
Aircraft Company as a consultant to follow the progress of
essential STS systems, landing gear, flight controls, mower and
other auxiliary systems as flight experience is obtained. It is
the plan to appoint Robert Rothi to the ASAP as a member when a
position becomes available in the statutory number of members due
to normal completion of terms. The total membership of the Panel
is listed in Appendix II.
ORIGINAL {'^^w ^', ML
OF POOR QUALITY
2
This year's Panel, report will be based upon newly analyzed
information from flights STS-1, and STS-2 in 1981, and the more
current information from STS-3, -4, and -5. In addition, we have
reviewed the status of R&D aircraft and administrative aircraft
flight safety procedures and administration for support, test,
and training flights utilizing NASA's fleet of aircraft based at
the several centers.
The Panel continued with its study of NASA's plans and
improvements to increase the flight rate of the Shuttle, improve
the logistics and reduce the turn-around costs.
NASA staff activities supporting the needs of the ASAP, the
gathering of data, the scheduling of fact-tinding tot the members
and the alert reporting of changes, test results, organization
changes, and NASA schedules have been exceptionally well handled
during 1982, and the Panel appreciates this excellent support.
As a result of its work the Panel has the following
conclusions and recommendations to make:
CONCLUSION 1
The Shuttle has been successful as a developmental vehicle
but the flight test series has been too short to completely
explore the design performance envelope.
RECOMMENDATION 1
A formal program should be implemented to identify flight
test objectives compatible with each Shuttle mission flown so
that the entire flight envelope will be defined in a timely
manner.
ORIGIN % Fhi7 il $
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CONCLUSION 2
The determination of the performance envelope of the Shuttle
includes a determination of the loads that the vehicle
experiences in flight. Before this determination is complete,
there have been parallel efforts to reduce actual factors of
safety in order to reduce weight. This reduction must proceed
cautiously until the structural loads and capability are
confirmed.
RECOMMENDATION 2
The Panel recommends that extreme caution be used in
decreasing structural factors of safety for weight purposes
before all the pertinent flight variations are explored and all
relevant data has been analyzed and taken into account. A
corollary recommendation is that the Modular Auxiliary Data
System (MARS) instrumentation package be carried until the flight
limits are determined.
CONCLUSION 3
The Shuttle and its operation is not an airline, even though
a
the airline approach to solving problems such as logistics may
well apply. The literal application of the detailed solt,t.i-in of
airline problems can be misleading when applied to Shuttle
situations. Nevertheless, Shuttle "operations" will be 	 {
sufficiently different from R&D flying to justify a major
operational organization which conc-ntrates on the reduction of i
turn-around time, cost, and operational safety. The R&D
community should respond to the operators of the STS on a demand
a
(contract) basis.
^a
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RECOMMENDATION 3
The NASA should identify a single, responsible operational
logistics organization, properly staffed, that should determine
what commercial methodology is useful to the Shuttle and then
determine the extent to which those methods are applied to
Shuttle problems.
CONCLUSIWN 4
Shuttle operation will require a major sustaining engineering
effort by the present NASA centers and contractors, particularly
until the operational capability is defined and implemented.
This should not be confused with, or funded as R&D.
RECOMMENDATION 4
In order to control operational economics, the Panel
recommends that the sustaining engineering should be the
responsibility of, and be budgeted by, the operational
organization, regardless of where and who does the work.
CONCLUSION 5
The pressure of schedules seems to have relaxed the rigor of
the certification process as applied to changes.
RECOMMENDATION 5
In the past, the certification of the Shuttle involved many
test considerations and revie^,,>. The current and future changes
in the Shuttle must have the same rigor of certification. The
policy and standards should be established by an independent
organization within NASA, e.g, the Chief Engineer, and should
OF PGOR QUALITY	 5
have the direct sponsorship of the Administrator. FAA processes
and practices may provide a model. Such a program if it is a
function of the NASA chief engineer, would also be independent of
any future operations organization and k thus, it would be in a
position to certify operational procedure and practices. Such a
procedure would also simplify the Panel's problem of being
informed of changes in a timely manner.
CONCLUSION 6
The aerodynamic flight stability of the Shuttle is
exceedingly important in the landing phases. To the extent that
this maneuver is a combination of the ship's very critical
stability Characteristics, the pilot'S perception of control
needs, and the computer's logic, it is a deceptively simple thing
with little room for error. The apparent panacea of switching to
the present autoland system should be cautiously explored. It is
also important to give the pilot every tool available to enhance
his perception of the craft's performance. The heads-up display
is in this category and is useful both in the manual as well as
in monitoring autoland performance.
RECOMMENDATION 6
The Panel recommends that autoland be tried at the earliest
opportunity where there is a "repeat" pilot who has previously
made a manual Shuttle landing. This dual experience will be
invaluable in assessing manual vs. automatic operation. It is
also recommended that the total installation of the heads-up
display be expedited and be operational for this demonstration.
CONCLUSION 7
Substantial redesign of the SSME turbomachinery is required
`or the desired engine life at the outputs needed by proposed
future payloads.
ORICalNAL 	 ` ,^ X11
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RECOMMENDATION 7
The Panel recommends the design of new replacement
turbomachinery for the SSME that will achieve current required
mission life at the full power level. If possible without
compromising the achievement of these objectives provisions might
be incorporated for future growth. In addition to the
procurement of adequate numbers of the current turbomachinery
elements, the interiu„ need for spares created by the short life
of the current machines at high output must be met.
CONCLUSION 8
The Panel feels that the landing gear tires and brakes have
proven to be marginal and constitute a possible hazard to the
Shuttle.
RECOMMENDATION 8
A study of a gear redesign should be started that will
achieve an adequate factor of safety with the maximum proposed
Shuttle loads. It seems to the Panel that such an effort should
include an investigation of changing the attitude of the Orbiter
on its gear. Reducing the nose-down attitude would substantially
reduce wheel loads during rollout and braking.
i.
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FLIGHT SYSTEMS EXPERIENCE THROUGH 1952
The ASAP, in following the reults of current flight data
commend both the development to&,% ,; at the centers and the
operational teams which launched, conducted the mission and
retrieved the Orbiter and its crews. The ASAP particularly
tracked the performance of the internal power systems, control
systems, and the thermal protection systems, all of which had
concerned the Panel in the initial development phases of the
program. It is encouraging to report that all of these systems
appear to be performing well.
The Panel has continuing concern regarding the progress in
flight control development, the confirmation of structural
integrity, the achievements of operational ratings of the main
engines, and the transition of the entire system to operational
status in the absence of complete flight confirmation of the
Shuttle element performance. These specific areas of
concentration for the ASAP are in the following sections.
FLIGHT CONTROL PERFORMANCE
The Demonstration of Autoland Systems
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel recommends that 	 m {
NASA Headquarters assure the completion of the remaining
simulations and tests of the Orbiter Autolend system, including
touchdown and rollouts, and, if successful, encourage the
earliest use thereof.
We believe that safety will be enhanced if the approach and
landing conditions of airspeed, angle of attack, sink speed, and
touchdown point can be optimized by automatic control. The
experience that suggest this emphasis includes:
,3. Studies of Shuttle landings to date show that tire,
ORIGINIAL 
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wheel, and brake stresses are approaching limits.
b. Short runways, with inadequate overruns, are a cause for
concern, for instance, a transAtlantic abort to Dakar.
i
C. Landing with excess speed increases stresses, as well as
exposing the Orbiter to a "weight on wheels" instability that is
divergent, as in mGst delta-wing aircraft.
Problems in pitch control of the Orbiter have been observed
since the Pilot Induced Oscillations (PIO) of the fifth Approach
and Landing Test (ALT 5). Some improvements can be made in
software and mechanical controls, but correction of the basic
characteristics would require complete redesign; perhaps
including canard control n;.-rfaces.
A skilled pilot, under non-stressful conditions, can "grease"
the Orbiter onto the runway; witness some of thQ beautiful
landings to date. This requires great precision in establishing
approach conditions, and the avoidance of any sudden inputs to
pitch control. Aborts, heavy payload 'landings, lest skilled
pilots - all bias conditions toward the limits in control and
mechanical capability.
An autoland landing takes the uncertain "gain" of the pilot
out of the loop. The precision and resolution of the Inertial
Measuring Units and the integrating rate gyros combined with
Microwave Scanning Bt-am Landing System (MSBLS? and the digital
autopilot allows the main computers to control attitude,
airspeed, and sink rate to a precision that few humans can match
exr,spt under ideal conditions.
s
As to reliability:
a. Automatic landings have been in use in commercial
aircraft operations for about 10 years.
R
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b. Elements of the autoland system have been used on every
Shuttle flight excluding final glide slopes and landing.
c. Dozens of Shuttle training aircraft flights have used the
MSB LS at KSC (down to about 20 feet above the runway).
In attempting to promote demonstration of the autoland
system, the ASAP recognizes these factors as valid:
a. Astronauts, by virtue of years of training and simulation
experience in the manual control process, are understandably
reluctant to "let a machine do it."
b. Monitoring progress of the autoland system is difficult
without a heads-up display or other device to assist in judging
progress and eases take-over in the event of system failure.
Nevertheless, the ASAP urges such a demonstration and
suggests the following:
1. A demonstration of the autoland system should be
scheduled for a repeat commander or pilot as soon as the heads-up
display is useable.
2. NASA should reexamine the auto braking and autolanding
gear extension systems to make the autolanding system complete.
3. Provisions for autoland should be installed at the most
likely contingency landing sites, e.g. Dakar.
4. The investigations of ground control de--orbit should be
revisited for possible rescue via automatic de-orbit and remote
or automatic control to autoland.
r
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STRUCTURAL INTEGR„T1'
During the year 1982, the ASAP has given particular attention
to the safety aspect of the following structural areas:
• Lightweight external tank
• Use of instrumented flight data
• Continued expansion of structural operating limits
• Structural modification of OV-102
• Filament wound motor cases for solid rocket boosters
Filament Wound Case for Solid Rocket Boosters
The ASAP reviewed the structural aspects of the Filament
Wound Case (FWC) at MSFC on June 10. The Panel's impression
based on this limited review Is that the plans for design,
development, and testing are well thought out and that the
4tx'z;,? y:^,al integrity of the final product will be solidly based
on test data. The minimum flight design factor of safety (F.S.)
is 1.4. At the pinned joints between composite and steel, a
F.S. -2,0 is used with "A ” allowables* based on test data.
Light Weight External Tank (LWT)
The specification for the original external tank, now called
Heavy Weight or Standard Tank (HWT), stated that the total inert
weight be not greater than 77,902 pounds. The actual inert
weight of the production HWT is 75,900 pounds, of which 57,195
pounds is structure.
*"A" allowables refers to material properties (e.g., tensile
and compressive strength) equal to 99% or more of the population
of measured values with a confidence level of 95%.
ORIGINAL	 4,
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As a weight reduction measure, the external tank has now been
redesigned and the new light weight tank has an actual inert
weight of 66,800 pounds, of which 52,589 pounds is structure; so
in going from the heavy to the light the structural weight was
reduced by 4,600 pounds or 8.0 percent. The remainder of the
10,400 pounds, sometime reported as weight reduction from the
original specification, took place in such nonstructural items as
plumbing, thermal protection provisions, and updating the weight
bookkeeping to account for the fact that the production HWT was
2,000 pounds underweight. Panel interest was focused on the
structural integrity of the LWT.
In its review of the LWT the ASAP has centered its attention
on the ligOd hyarogen (LH2) section for the following reasons
(further discussion is found in Appendix III):
o The structural weight of the LH 2
 tank of the LWT was
reduced by 10.5 percent from that of the HWT.
o A critical design condition for the external tank is at
staging of the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB). In the
absence of the SRB thrust, most of the 1.5M pounds total
thrust of the orbiter's three main engines is transmitted
from the Orbiter to the aft end of the LH 2
 tank and passes
upward through the LH 2
 tank to the liquid oxygen (LOX)
tank, which is the major mass of the stack at that time.
The thrust loading produces an axial compression and an
overall bending due to the eccentricity of the thrustload,
both of which produce compressive stresses in the LH 2 tank
shell facing the Orbiter. The most probable failure mode
is an instability, or buckling, of the LH 2
 tank shell
which could lea;9 to serious consequences.
0 The buckling strength of the LH 2
 section of the LWT has
been verified by test only to limit load (i.e., 109% of
rated power level of the main engines) so that any margin
OF POOR QA f ,' U	
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of safety between actual operating conditions and failing
conditions is dependent solely on analytical procedures.
o Analytical procedures for prediction of shell
instabilities are complex and not well correlated with
experimental results, particularly for concentrated loads
imposed on a complex nonuniform stiffened shell such as
the LH2 tank.
o The analyses that had been done were linear 'bifurcation
types (STAGS and BOSOR).
The ASAP was concerned about the structural integrity of the
Light Weight External Tank because:
• Data on strength justification has been sparse.
• Reluctance to depend entirely on linear analytical methods
to predict failing instability of a complex shell-like
structure subjected to concentrated loads as in the LH2
tank when the design factor of safety is as low as 1.255.
The maximum thrust of the main Orbiter engines to be used
during STS-6 is 104% of rated power level. This provides a
test derived F.S. of 1.14 (i.e., 1.19 FS @ RPL/1.04 RPL) for this
flight. Concern within ASAP over this narrow margin resulted in
a meeting which is reported in Appendix III among NASA personnel,
technical members of the Martin-Marietta Corporation, with ASAP
members at which views concerning the adequacy of analysis were
expressed by two independent consultants in analytical methods
for shell structures. The following recommendation resulted from
this meeting: The ASAP accepts the adequacy of the current
analysis and tests for the next Shuttle operation, but recommends
that the nonlinear analysis now planned be performed to add
further confirmation of the structrual adequacy of the Light
Weight Tank (LWT) before flights using 109% of rated power level
are approved. We understand this work is now underway.
is
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Use of Instrumented Flight Data
The first five Shuttle flights have produced a substanital
amount of instrumented flight measurements that are of extreme
importance to safely exploiting the full structural capability of
the STS. To realize the latent benefits of these flight data, it
needs to be reduced to a readily useable form and then analyzed
by stress analysts familiar with the structural arrangement, the
design loading conditions, the analytical and experimental
internal load determinations, and the failing stress allowsbles.
Continued Expansion of Structual Operating Limits
The instrumented flight data already collected during the
missions of STS-1 through STS-5, properly analyzed, will provide
a valuable data base to aid in predicting the safe magnitude of
steps that can be taken in exploring beyond the boundaries
established by the first five flights. The Development Flight
Instrumentation (DFI) package used on the first five flights had
the capacity to measure and record information from 4,000
sensors (strain gauges, thermocouples, pressure transducers,
etc.). Because the DFI occupied a good portion of the payload
bay and weighed about 11,000 pounds, it had to be removed from
OV-102 after STS-5 to make room and payload available for
Spacelab 1. There are no plans to use the DFI package on any
future STS missions. To safely explore and establish the
structural limits needed to utilize the full capability of the
STS .
 , some flight instrumentation to monitor critical strength
items will be required.
Some of the issues involved in expanding the structural
limits are:
c
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• Ascent and entry loads
• Payload/Orbiter dynamic interaction
• Ascent aerodynamic loads distribution
• Structural thermal stresses versus cross range
It appears that the vehicle best suited to carry the brunt of
the structural limits expansion is OV-102 after it has been
through the Maxi-Mod process and has been equipped with a Modular
Auxiliary Data System (MADS).1/ Thus modified and equipped,
OV-102 will have full strength and adequate instrumentation to
safely expand the structural operating envelop-:-.
,^'ih.t,'llc•i^ ► lYr1i	
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OV-102, as it flew the STS-1 through STS-5 missions, had
unexpected structural limitations brought about by weight growth
and early loads later found in need of correction. Discrepancies
were dispositioned for the operational flight tests (OFT) and
performance placards were issued on maneuver load factor (2g) and
landing sink rate (6 fps). In addition, top sun conditioning was
required prior to entry to relieve thermal stresses.
The ASAP understands that present plans are to use OV-102
to fly the STS-9 mission. The landing gross weight for STS-9
will be about 222,000 pounds which compares to the maximum
previous landing weight of 209,483 pounds (STS-4). Also, the
1/The MADS planned for OV-102 will have the capability to record
data from 855 sensors, of which about 500 are allocated to
structures-related measurements.
^J
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load carric-d as cargo will be somewhat over 35,0;0 pounds which
exceeds the previous maximum of 32,279 pounds (STS-5).
Therefore, the STS-9 flight will need to be made with more
restrictive flight limits than STS-1 through STS-5 in order to
maintain the same margins of safety. In order to maintain the
margin of safety of 1.4 in an abort-once-around, the maneuvering
load factor, n z , would be restricted to 1.4g and the sink rate on
landing would be restricted to about 4.5 fps. The Panel believes
that, with special training and special precautions, the tighter
restrictions required for STS-9 can be safely flown, albeit at
some higher level of risk than with a full strength vehicle.
The ASAP recommends that serious consideration be given to
incorporating the Maxi-Mod modification into OV-102 following the
STS-9 mission and also installing the planned data system (MADS),
so that a full strength vehicle with adequate instrumentation can
be used to continue the expansion of the operating envelope to
the safe limits of the fleet vehicle.
ORBITER LANDING GEA0
The landing gear including wheels, tires, and brakes, is
vital for the safe completion of any mission. With the future
flights going to higher weights and lower margins, possibly even
negative :margins, it is imperative that existing capabilities be
telly explored, documented and improved where necessary.
Of particular concern are the following:
o The inclusion of HUD or Autoland to consistently minimize
the touchdown speed and distance from the runway threshold and to
assure the optimum vehicle attitude to preclude PIO's and high
ground loads.
0 The inclusion of an Autobrak e system to relieve the work
4ORIGINAL
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load on the pilot during a high strain period and to assure a
uniform maximum brake pressure available to achieve the desired
stopping distance.
o The high torque peaking of the carbon lining and the low
strength of the beryllium stator and rotor keyways. The
combination of materials should be reviewed as well as the means
of attaching the brake to the axle. Excessive axle deflections
under the abnormally severe	 loads induced by the negative
angle of attack at high ground speeds dictate some type of
floating mount to prevent the brakes from carrying ground loads
in addition to the normal braking loads.
o The abnormally severe loads imposed on the main tires due
to the 3.920 negative angle of attack with the nose tire on the
ground at high speeds. At 240,000 pounds with aft c.g., the
static load on each main tire is only 54,000 pounds; whereas, at
165 knots the tire load increases to 140,000 pounds. Not only
does this require stronger tires, but also higher inflation
pressures, over 315 psi, to keep the tire defletions and carcass
temperatures within limits. As tire pressures and ground speeds
increase, the attainable coefficient of friction between the tire
and the runway decreases thus increasing the stopping distance.
A longer nose gear would help reduce the negative angel of attack
and the main gear loads. Or it might even be possible to replace
the dual main wheels with four wheel bogies to reduce the load
per tire.
o The foreign--object damage to the thermally protected
Shuttle surface by debris thrown up by the tires was mentioned in 	 a
last year's report. When the landing performance has been
improved to the point of using the paved runways, this issue will
be resolved. Being able to use the paved runways available for
normal landing and for emergency aborts is essential for
continuing safe operations.
iOF POOR QUALITY
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LITHIUM BATTERIES
The Panel was asked to assess the safety of the use of
lithiut,-bromine complex batteries just prior to the launch of
STS-5. The batteries in question were small A-A size cells for
use in hand-held radios; D size cells in the cassette data
recorders, space suit lights, TV cameras and the survival radio.
An investigation revealed that the internal cell and battery
hazards were acceptable and the Panel agreed that no Changes
should be made prior to STS-5, since the batteries were already
on hand if not on board.
Lithium batteries have a large advantage in energy storage
capability over standard batteries but their characteristics in
many operational modes are not fully understood and accidents may
occur if operating limits are exceeded and quality assurance is
not assiduously controlled in their manufacture. Protection is
provided to control the hazards. However, there are undoubtedly
certain applications that are not practical with any other
battery. In those cases, they should be used with suitable
precautions. It is not so clear why the hazard would be
acceptable in a flashlight or hand-held radio application. In
making such a judgment, one should weigh all the factors such as
energy requirements, safety, convenience of handling,'operating
limitations and disposal.
A corollary of this particular Panel activity is that a
mechanism must be developed to bring hazardous items such as this
to the Panel's attention in a timely manner.
EVA AND PREBREATHING
Extra-vehicular activity is a useful adjunct to the
Shuttle's capability but, as currently planned, it is not without
important limitations. To be most useful the suit should operate
ORIGINAL G >L ^ r 
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at the environmental conditions sufficiently close to those of
tho cabin to eliminate the need for prebreathing in order to
prevent the "bends." Current prebreathing time and protocol
limits the emergency capability of EVA. The ASAP recognizes that
the design of an all-purpose space suit, useful as a work station
as well as an emergency device, is not simple but believes that
the present design should be reviewed to make sure that it is
acceptable.
It is not clear to the ASAP that there are major requirements
for EVA except in some -emergencies or the replacement of failed
elements of expensive satellites. The requirements for emergency
use appear to the ASAP to preclude systems that require long
hours at different pressures than the normal cabin pressure and
extended prebreathing times. it is suggested that an analysis be
made for different failure Scenarios. Different EVA requirements
will undoubtedly emerge and such requirememts could dictate EVA
equipment design requirements.
MAIN ENGINES
With but one exception, all propulsion systems of the Shuttle
functioned flawlessly during all the flights this year. The
performance of each of the systems: the main engines (SS ►ME°s),
the solid rocket boosters (SRB's) and the orbital maneuvering
system (OMS) engines was within the range predicted. The one
incident that marred this otherwise perfect record was the
failure of the SRS recovery system in the STS-4 flight. This
,failure had no effect on the mission itself although the SRB
motor cases were lost. The subtle cause of this failure was
identified and the corrective act:.on; implemented for the STS_,
flight succ4eded in overcoming the problem.
The certification program for the FPLa (109%) version of the
SSME, in contrast, has been beset by test failures and problems
-^4
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that have impeded achievement of engine certification. There
were two serious incidents, both resulting in significant loss of
hardware. Both of these failures involved developmental hardware
changes, in one instance installed on a certification engine.
Failure reviews were conducted, the causes identified and
corrective actions implemented. The loss of hardware suffered
exacerbated an already existing problem of limited engine
hardware availability. The Panel has noted in the past its
concern about the meager supply of hardware in the SSME program.
The problems that were encountered with SSME turbomachinery
during development and certification of the RPL (100%) version of
the engine have reappeared in the FPL program. This is most
probably a consequence of the higher speeds and operating
temperatures associated with operating at the FPL thrust level.
These problems include turbine blade cracking and sheet metal
cracking in the HPFTP and bearing wear and distress and
subsynchronous-whirl in the HPFTP. All of these phenomena are
life-limiting. As a consequence, during the FPL certification
program frequent replacements of the turbopumps have been
required. As of the end of October 1982, no FPL "nigh-pressure
turbopump had been able to accumulate more than 2500 seconds of
operation without removal for cause.
There exists a program of ftsign changes to the turbopumps
intended to alleviate the problems encountered. It is the
consensus of the several groups that have examined the situation
that, with continuing development and the present approach to
certification, an engine with satisfactory and safe performance
at 109% should be achieved albeit with limited life. This will
require frequent change-outs and inspections of the
turbomachinery operationally.
There is a growing body of opinion that the origin of the
problems of the turbomachines is of a "systems" nature rather
than a set of discrete component difficulties. Under such
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conditions a set of "tixes" to components within the physical
constraints of the current design would, at best, be of limited
value.
It would seem prudent, therefore, to undertake a major
redesign of the turbopumps as the long-range solution to the
problems. At the same time, in recognition of the planned rapid
increase in launch rate and the long time (3-5 years) required to
design, develop and certify redesigned turbomachinery, provision
should be made to acquire additional spare turbopumps of current
FPL design to accomodate the frequency of removals that is to be
anticipated.
During 1982 the Panel also emphasized the SSME operational
planning and status of logistics planning so that the inevitable
emphasis on turn-around time reduction and turn-around co,=t s
will not introduce additional hazards. It was apparent to the
Panel that substantial planning had been done but that the buaget
support of such plans may be a major constraint towards the
attainment of Safe rapid turn-around. Specifically:
o The critical dependence on the performance of the high and
low pressure turbo pumps for both oxygen and hydrogen, coupled
with only modest improvements in the mean-time-to-tailure of
these elements, suggests that more spares are essential. This
would contribute to safety and would preclude dependence on
cannibalizing production elements for flight support.
o Not apparent in the planning is the development of a
dedicated facility or function for maintenance and overhaul'
turn-round of main engines. This will be necessary before
minimum safe turn-around time and cost is achieved.
o Proposals within NASA which include contractor operation
of major elements of the Shuttle or the entire STS for purposes
of reducing cost should be carefully evaluated for their effect
L
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on safety. This is noted in the discussion of the SSME because
it is felt that operation, testing, inspection, and monitoring of
flight data is still, and will be for some time, critically
dependent on experience rather than on developed methods and
procedures. Shifting turn-around or maintenance responsibilities
to a separate organization should be approached with extreme
caution.
o The decision to purchase another Shuttle is not a
substitute for a fully developed logistics, maintenance, and
spates program, which is properly funded. This comment applies
to the entire STS program.
Appendix IV contains a more detail report on the above
summary comments with particular reference to the investigations
done in logistics and spares planning.
omclitjnL
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IMPROVEMENTS FOR ROUTINE OPERATIONS
NASA ORGANIZATION ARRANGEMENTS
The challenge: of achieving true operationl, status for the
space transportation system is, in many ways +
 as rigorous a test
of NASA's management and technical capabilities as the
development effort itself. Recognition of this fact at NASA's
top management levels is essential if the management challenge is
to be met successfully.
The problem arises, in part, by the Shuttle's progressive
testing and performance enhancement which will continue well into
the operational flight schedule. This meatis that the experience
and expertise of the development centers and their associated
contractors must be readily accessible during this shakedown
period that will last for another 5 years or longer. At the same
time, however, an effort to build a truly operational system
within an organizational structure dominated by the development
centers is likely to fail. This is the core of NASA's present
management dilemma.
The development centers--patticu.larly JSC and MSFC--are not
attuned by experience or philosophy to the management discipline
that is essential to a successful commercial operation. Their
understandable mutual competition within NASA for assignments and
budgets, and their associated reluctance to let go of areas of
responsibility .once assigned, are serious obstacles to building a
well-integrated and disciplined operational entity. In other
words, the ::ecentralization and Fragmentation of responsibility
inherent in a center-based strategy will, in the end, confound
all efforts to operate the system efficiently through steering
committees and task groups. At the same time, NASA cannot risk
cutting itself loose from the centers' experience and expertise.
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The panel also recognizes the severe budgetary constraints
that are likely to impede realization of an optimum logistics
strategy in support of a routine and reliable commercial
operation. For example, it would be unrealistics to maintain the
level of spares that would routinely be obtained by a commercial
airline operation. Similarly, a dedicated overhaul facility in
the vicinity of KaC may also be an unrealistic expenditure, much
as it might improve turnaround time. Numerous and difficult
trad Botts will be needed in this budgetary environment. This
fact heightens the need for a clearly defined lines of
reponsibility and authority within NASA to make -here decisions.
It is not the panel's responsibility to prescribe a specific
solution to this management dilemma surrounding the Shuttle's
transition to an operational commercial system. However, the
significant safety considerations that are directly linked to
this transition suggest several approaches or principles that
should be considered by NASA management.
o The organizational arrangement within NASA that is to be
responsible for commercial operation of the Shuttle should be
determined and announced, even though full implementation of this
arrangement might not be feasible for the gext several years.
o As a first step, the management core of this operational
organization should be established as soon as possible and given
authority to resolve major management and budget issues that will
inevitably arise among the development centers as they support
Shuttle testing and enhancement during the transition period.
This core group would logically be situated at NASA Headquarters.
This is another way of saying that someone at or near the top
must clearly be in charge to control the natural competition
among the centers.
o The relationship of the development centers to the
.operational organization ;houid be one of subcontractors,
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providing the development skills and expertise as requested on a
reimbursable basis, Budget and Shuttle performance improvement
program decisions would be the province of the operational
organization.
o The role of the Shuttle Processing Contractor must be
recognized as evoluntionary, given the Shuttle's continuing
enhancement and a host of other uncertainties. The operational
organization within NASA must retain ultimate responsibility for
the Shuttle's commercial operation, as well as defining the
^::!--)ecific roles and responsibilities of the SPC. A similar
Headquarters control of the roles and responsibilities of the
potential payload processing contractor should exist.
o NASA should give serious consideration in the long term to
establishing the operational organization as a Government
corporation, in order to achieve effective separation from 'Cho
developmenmt centers which otherAse might function as de facto
commercial operators of the STS. The benefits of establishing
such an entity whose sole reason-for-being was the efficient and
reliable operation of the Shuttle could be significant. At the
same time, such a separation might enable the centers to pursue
their historic R&D roles more effectively.
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION
Today the Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN)
consisting of fifteen ground stations provides less than 20%
coverage of the Shuttle in orbit. The transmission of both voice
and commands on the FM uplink from the ground to the Shuttle and
the transmissin of voice and telemetry on the FM downlink are
provided by an S-band communications system operating at the
relatively low data rate of 32 KBPS uplink and 92 KBPS downlink.
There are four flush mounted antennas on the Orbiter vehicle
which provide a dual redundant communications path to tho ground
stations.
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In the near future the STIA will be augmented by two
operational Tracking and Data Relay Satellites In qeosynchronous
orbit and separated by approximately 135 degrees and will be able
to extend this covera(le of the orbiting Shuttle to 65 - 90%
These satellite r, - also called WVIISTAR - together with a ground
station at White Sands, Now Mexico # constitute the Tracking and
Data Relay Satellite Systems (TDRSS) . The system will provide
NASA With telecommunioation servicea, as needed. Current plans
Include orbitinq a spare satellite between the two active
savollites that oan be moved Into position to replace a failed
satellite. The Shuttle orbiter S-band system will then be able
to communivate with the ground through the TDRSS system and will
do so whenever It, can.
in addition, a wide--band communications link from the Shuttle
Orbiter to the ground via the TDRSS system is currently planned,
'rhir, link will be used for on-orbit transmission oC 2 MBPS to 50
MBPS of scientiLio data ande on a time-shared basis # will also
accommodate television, analog scientific data, experiment or
operational tape recorder dumps, etc. A deployable 36 inch
steerable antonna shored with the Orbiter rendezvous radar
stisbsystem, operating In the 1w bond and stowed in the payload
bay will be used for this communications link. Unfortunately,
this, Ku band system Is only sinqlo-string for budgetary
considerations but on the surface (it least door, not appear to be
a safety related item.
When the TDRSS is proven to be operational, all but three or
four or the STDN ground stations will be phosed out.. The target
dato is mid-1984. Althouqh the direct communication ground link
will than be far less than the curront 20% coverage, the DOD
ground facilities at seven locations world-wide will always bo
available an, a backup should the satellite relay system fail.
(Tt shoul(I be noted that this will not be the first time that a
mannod spaocoraft has utilized satellites for communication - it
was suovessfolly demonstratcid during the ASTIR joint min lion with
J
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the Russians in the mid-seventies.)
No plans are currently underway by NASA to assess
specifically the safety aspects of the new communications system
and the ASAP has not yet been briefed on the subject. However,
the Panel will request such a briefing sometime during the
calendar year 1983. Scheduled tests of the system are planned
for March and again in August of 1983 and the Panel will
certainly wish to review those test results.
SURVIVAL CONCEPTS
Over the last few years the ASAP has participated in many
discussions of crew survivability, particularly during the launch
and possible ditching of the Shuttle as the result of an abort.
Although the circumstance of a ditching is remote, the conclusion
of analysts suggests that an intact structure from which escape
is possible on ditching is not probable. Thus, an ejection
system operable at lower speeds is perhaps the only practical
solution to the ditching problem. It should also be configured
to serve for some launch aborts. The standard ejection seats
have already been determined to be impractical for more than two
crew members but there is a current technology in use involving a
tractor rocket that lifts a person through a suitable opening.
Concepts show that after,ejection of four crew members, the
succeeding flight crew members move into position at the cabin
opening before firing their rockets. This solution is very
complex, but the Panel recommends that NASA study its application
to the Shuttle with two to six crewmen and determine the cost
to install in a new Shuttle as well as the cost and feasibility
of retrofitting current Orbiters.
The Panel feels that an even more likely problem is a ground
incident occasioned by a blown tire or gear failure on landing.
Immediate ejection could not only Gave a major number of the
crew, but would open more escape routes. This should be analyzed
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in detail because a landing incident is believed to be more
likley than the ditching or a major launch malfunction.
ROLE OF CREW VS. GROUND
The real time control and management of space missions by
Mission Control has served well but requires extensive and
expensive communications if continuous control is, in effect,
to be maintained. This was necessary during the test mission of
the STS and desirable where Shuttle misions are unique and
relevant experts can be gathered at Mission Control. In the case
of Che Shuttle as a transport system, substantial economies would
result if a greater degree of reliance on the crew were to be
achieved. The crews must be permitted and aided to develop a
reliance on their own capabilities in emergencies that may occur.
It is suggested that crews should be encouraged to work toward
the routine execution of the entire mission, calling upon ground
assistance only in unusual situations. The ultimate savings will
only be realized if the entire operational support structure is
streamlined as a result of flight experience and appropriate
divisions of responsibility are achieved.
ASAP PRIORITY LIST OF SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS
Over the years a number of suggestions have been made by the
ASAP not to emphasize major hazards in the current design of the
Shuttle systems but to note those systems which do not appear to
be sufficiently simple or to have adequate safety back up and
must, therefore, demand "every flight" detail checks and
inspections before safety can be assured. The ASAP feels that
NASA has not done a comprehensive study of this type of systems
improvement but has concentrated primarily on improvements to the
payload performance. As in prior reports and letters to NASA,
the ASAP suggests such a review of the consistency of redundancy
in the Shuttle systems designs and the potential for changing
entire systems concepts to simplify operations by permitting
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quick turn-arounds without "every flight" attention to the
potential safety performance of the subsystem.
Without such a study it is not possible to defend any
particular priority listing but the ASAP, on the basis of its
collective judgment continues to feel concern about the following
systems:
o The APU system - particularly the APU installation in the
solid propellant boosters.
o	 The rudder-speeu-brake mechanical control system
downstream of the drive motors.
o	 The landing gear system, particularly the wheels and
tires (can the ground attitude of the Orbiter be
modified?).
o	 Crew escape (for maximum number) at launch and prior to
potential ditching or during and after a landing
accident.
o	 EVA system to reduce time from decision to emergence.
.A
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POLICY ISSUES FOR OPERATIONS
Whatever NASA decides to do with respect to organizational
structure to support routine operations of the Space
Transportation System, it appears to the ASAP that Headquarters
attention should be directed to the creation or clarification of
broad NASA policy in several critical areas. These include:
logistics and maintenance planning, certification, configuratin
control, and component life determination. A brief discussion
under each of these headings follows:
LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE PLANNING
A comprehensive overall integrated logistics plan for the
entire Shuttle system is essential and overdue. This should
include all major elements; e.g., Orbiter, ET, SRB, SSME, OMS &
RCS, etc. Overhaul and repair facilities as well as spares
stocking and warehousing issues should also be addressed. The
plan should address the "near term" problems specifically and
give an outline of the "longer term" requirements. Even if this
plan is altered shortly after issue, the discipline entailed in
its preparation will have served its purpose.
A maintenance plan for the entire system should be evolved
along the lines of the FAA Maintenance Review Board philosophy.
This can be either a part of the plan in the preceding paragraph
or alternatively developed as a separate task. It will be
required, however, to examine the adequacy of the present spares
procurement quantities.
The Maintenance Engineering Analysis (MEA) or Failure Modes
and Effects Analyses (FMEA) process for all components of the
Orbiter is admirably thorough but may be exhaustive and,
therefore, completed too late to be of value for the plans
mentioned in the two previous paragraphs. While MEA's will be
essential for major components, a more practical approach using
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flight line and launch pad experience should be considered in the
interests of placing spares orders immediately. A small task
force could probably accomplish this if given a suitable mandate.
The spares quantities which have been ordered thus far and
which were declared in General Abrahamson's logistics status
review at KSC on November 9 to be essentially completely
delivered in some cases, are probably insufficient. The small
task force referred to in the previous paragraph could examine
this question, but if the spares of SSME's and their major
component are any criterion, then there may be a problem.
Certainly in the interest of safety we cannot continue the
present practice of "cannibalization" and robbing of the
production line to meet each launch date.
The prospect of eliminating or reducing the cove rage of
certain maintenance manuals, illustrated parts catalogs and
wiring diagram manuals in the interest of economy is viewed with
dismay. The success of the current concept, especially in the
longer term (say 1990), will be partly dependent upon adequate
and accurate publication.
The "sustaining engineering" function should be critically
examined to avoid duplication between NASA and the Shuttle prime
contractors. If it is eventually vested in the SPC group, it
should draw skills from each major contractor and take due notice
of the problems of continuity of experience which might be
endangered by attrition, retirements, and the like. Obsolescence
of some of the equipment and disappearance of some smaller
vendors will be a special problem in this respect in the"longer
term."
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In addressing the above, it may be useful to study "Notes on
Relationships of Shuttle Program to Commercial Airline Logistics"
November 20, 1982, included as appendix V of this report.
THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS
In the process of reviewing changes for performance
improvement and the basis for certification, the ASAP is
concerned that the certification process for such changes is
inconsistent, i.e., the rigor of the originally specified
certification process.
Examples of changes that may have had less rigor in their
certification are: the safety factor reduction in the new light
weight external tank and the decision not to test to ultimate
load, the substitution of (ruilted material for the silicon
thermal protection tile over large areas of the Orbiter. Taking
such actions during an experimental program is inevitable, but
steps should be taken to complete certification of all
significant changes.
The suggestion by the ASAP is that NASA Headquarters
institute r review of the total certification process for Shuttle
hardware as well as support functions such as software
certification, ground support processes, maintenance-monitoring,
etc. It is further suggested that the policy for certification
and the approval for deviation be a Headquarters responsibility.
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CONFIGURATION CONTROL
The objective of a certification program for a vehicle is to
validate that all of its parts in fact perform together as a
completely configured system. Substitutions of components or
subsystems that have not been involved in such a formal
integrated test program could invalidate the certification status
of the vehicle by changing its configuration.
Several times during the year the Panel was presented
with information regarding configuration identification program
related to the initial builds underway for the remaining Orbiter
vehicles. However, at some of the subsystem levels the detailed
configurations havO not always been determined. For example,
while investigating the logistics support plans for the SSME, we
found that complete indentured parts list does not yet exist for
full-power engines. We believe there are many issues still open
on the final full-power engine configuration. Lack of a detailed
indentured parts list is cause for concern with regard to even
defining explicitly the baseline for a configuration control
program on the SSME.
Shortly before the STS-5 launch there was even some
discussion as to whether all three engines would have the same
certified configuration as a result of the impeller damage on the
pump of one engine and lack of an available replacement with
identical configuration. Although this problem was "resolved" by
using the damaged pump, it highlights another issue; namely, how
to maintain a certified system configuration without an adequate
supply of configured components for replacement.
Because changes are being continually introduced to correct
problems identified either during development or from flight
operations, it is likely that each of the four Orbiter vehicles
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will have different, as-integrated, configurations at the
detailed level. This may be true also in the case of the
external, tank and the solid boosters; at least for the next
several years. Furthermore, the extremely limited replacement
hardware supply will cause changes to the as-integrated
configurations through substitution of new design components or
cannibalization of older design components. This is particularly
probable on the engine, power supply and electronics subsystems.
It is the Panel's opinion that NASA must adhere to a rigidly
disciplined methodology in which each vehicle's configuration is
identified and recorded in detail, and its individual
certification status maintained. There should be no planned
substituion of components without a full understanding of the
implications to the overall system operation and safety. The
computerized configuration and validation records combined with
change control rules should also form the basis for the logistic
maintenance and reliability programs. One must particularly
guard against changes made under the pressure of an imminent
launch schedule where system implications cannot always be
identified nor assessed.
An example that amplifies the above concern was raised by the
premature separation of the parachute riser lines on the SRB
cases during STS-4. In this case, a change in operational
concept was coupled with a hardware change. However, it appears
that a change in switch sensitivity may have occurred which
resulted in the riser line release at the low g -level of the
frustum separation event. The important safety implication is
that an adequate vehicle Configuration Control Program involves
not only the documentation of a fully certified system
configuration and a disciplined change authorization procedure,
but also quality control at the field level to assure that
components changed are as specified.
J
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COMPONENT LIFE DETERMINATION
In the design and development process for the Shuttle system,
specifications were set up for each element and then a test
program devised to demonstrate that the component would qualify
for the desired life under the postulated conditions. Now that
the Shuttle is flying, we have the opportunity to check whether
or not the real conditions are as predicted and to determine the
actual life of the component. This information is not only
needed in the spares and logistics program, but will establish
what the real margin of safety is for the various subsystem of
the Shuttle. These data are vital for the guidance of the
sustaining engineering program and must be obtained even though
the necessary test and inspection may increase estimated costs
 the	 ..,
 t ii mIo „ the near term :and leng thent.l1C VZIrn' arrittitd ..s^ .^v- 3,^.
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FLIGHT SAFETY FOR NASA AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS
During 1982 a series of accidents in aircraft operations made
it clear that further emphasis on operational safety for support
and test aircraft was necessary throughout the NASA organization.
The ASAP, responding to a specific request from Administrator
Jar►,.s Beggs, issued a letter report on September 13, 1982 (see
Appendix VII) .
Following the Panel report, NASA Headquarters initiated
reviews of JSC and LaRC by ECO Syst6m International Company
resulting in their report "NASA Flight Operations Review". In the
ECO report, as well as the ASAP review, studies of the
distribution of accidents as to cause such as weather, pilot
error; powerplant, etc., have shoe:n.that pilot error is the
principal culprit. This is true whether the class of operation
is commercial airline, general aviation, or military. There is
no reason to believe that NASA flight operations are any
different.
Assuming that pilot error will be the principal cause of
future NASA accidents, it is clear that the normal management
approaches to discipline and procedures must be augmented and
monitored.
Pilot errors can be attributed to training, current
proficiency, physical. condition, and mental attitudes such as
carelessness or lack of patience. NASA has special problems
because of the variety of its flight operations and the wide
spectrum of pilot experience.
Supervision is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to
combat pilot errors. Selection, training, proficiency, and
physical conditioning are some of the factors that can be
monitored but when the wheels come up into the wells, the pilot
is on his own and pilot attitude governs flight safety.
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Pilot attitudes are a result experience, training, and by
examples set by other pilots of established reputation. In this
respect, NASA has a wealth of expertise that can make a major
contribution. The ASAP suggests an education program that could
be sponsored by the Intercenter Aircraft Operations Group (ICAOC)
which could take the form of a series of "leadership" seminars to
be given at weekly (or monthly) flight safety meetings held at
various centers.
The "stable" of experienced and famous test pilots NASA
employs is large. It is felt that a series of seminiars on
interesting subjects by selected speakers would instill in the
younger and less experienced pilots an appreciation of the
disciplines and attitudes that make for safe flying and allowed
these senior pilots to achieve a remarkably accident free career.
The program could include:
1. The flying characteristics of the B747 and the problems
of trucking the Orbiter across the country.
2. LaRC discussing stall and spin avoidance and recovery
techniques.
3. the pilots could give a talk on traffic control and
communications around and approaching busy airports like JFK,
LAX, O'Hare, Atlanta, and Washington National.
4. DFRC might decribe some of the special techniges and
precautions taken in establishing speed and altitude records.
5. Review experiences in flying large delta--wing aircraft
or swing-wing type aircraft as well as the SR-71, B-1 and others
ORIGINAL	 is
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5. Some of the hazards exposed and lessons learned through
the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System could be discussed by
an appropriate speaker from Ames Research Center.
NASA response to previous recommendations has been entirely
positive although all programs based on these suggestions have
not as yet been implemented. The extent to which the centers
implement standard, cooperative programs and the progress on
utilization of the Intercenter Aircraft Operations Group will be
reviewed and monitored by the ASAP in 1983.
t
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PLANS FOR ASAP 1983 EFFORTS
During 1983 the ASAP intends to concentrate on the progress
of the space Shuttle flight experience with particular emphasis
on the confirmation of the design flight envelope, maximum c.g.
limits, maximum landing weight, and maximum reentry heat load.
In addition, particular attention will be paid to those systems
that should continue to have individual inspection,
refurbishment, or flight--to-flight replacement to maintain safety
in routine operations.
In addition, the ASAP intend to concentrate on the
improvement of systems to enhance performance or reduce cost and
to be certain that such changes do not add extra hazards. It is
hoped that such changes will be made for the specific purpose of
reducing hazards. It is the conviction of the ASAP that changes
which reduce specific requirements for flight-to-flight
maintenance or part replacement will not only reduce hazards but
also cost of operation. 1983 should see the use of the heads-up
cockpit display making possible the demonstration of autolanding.
Changes now planned that will require specific attention are
the light weight external tank and the filament-wound solid
rocket propellant cases. These designs will be followed as they
mature. Not yet planned nor defined are changes to reduce the
hazard to the crew in a number of potentially survivable
incidents such as ditching, launch malfunctions, and hard
landings. Elsewhere in this report the ASAP has suggested a
serious study of progress if it is initiated.
As operations expand there will be a variety of payloads,
many of which may have the potential of increasing the hazards
for routine operation. Of particular concern are the payloads
which have propulsion and pyrotechnic elements or extend beyond
the payload bay door envelope. Of particular interest is the
wide-tank Centaur.
ii
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A major change in Shuttle communications and geographical
communication coverage will take place with the introduction of
the TDRSS satellite based communications system. During 1983 the
Panel will review the details of this system and the potential it
has for hazards or the removal ox present hazards to safe
operations.
f
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APPENDIX F
LISTING OF PANEL ACTIVITIES FOR CY 1982
Panel fact-finding sessions have been conducted on the
average of three times per month for 1982. Members and
consultants have during this same period visited six NASA centers
and facilities (ARC, DFRC, La RC, JSC, MSFC, KSC) as well as NASA
Headquarters, and three NASA prime contractors. Although these
have been focused on the Space Transportation System, there have
been a number of fact-finding visits aimed at reviewing and
assessing aeronutical operations and attendant flight safety.
The Panel has, where practical, participated in a number of
significant in-house reviews; e.g., Flight Readiness Reviews, STS
Mission Control activities. Panel efforts have been supported by
the Panel Staff Director through in-depth and continuous
participation and reviewing of STS program/project activities and
aeronautical R&D and administrative flight safety activities.
The breadth of Panel discussions goes from the NASA
Administrator and Deputy Administrator to Program Directors
on into the subsystem design and test personnel (the "hands-on"
people). Beyond this is the Panel's annual report provided to
the NASA Administrator and through testimony before the
appropriate House and Senate subcommittees in January-March
period. where requested, the Panel provides individual support
to special review teams'such as the Solid Rocket Booster STS-4
Review Group and the Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Assessment Group.
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APPENDIX I
SUBJECT: Panel Fact-Finding Sessions, CY 1982
Date Location Attendees/Subject	 S
1/21/82 Headquarters Annual meeting,	 1981
activities	 (Panel)
2/24/82 Wash., DC Testimony before
Congress	 (Panel)
2/25-26/82 JSC Discuss results derived
1
from STS-2 which affect
future fight/mission
hardware	 (Panel)
3/9-10/82 KSC STS-3 Flight Readiness
Review	 (Parmet,
McDonald, Hawkins)
3/15/82 Headquarters
V
Flight test activities,
aero safey meeting
w/Beggs	 (Davis)
3/20/82 KSC L-2 review for STS-3
(Hawkins)
3/21-22/82 JSC STS-3 mission control
room
	
(Davis)
3/28-29/82 JSC MCC operations.,
preparation for landing
STS-3
	
(Davis)
4/26-28/82 Rocketydne SSME status	 (Himmel)
5/5-7/82 HQ/MSFC Met w/codes 0 & M STS
development & operation.
ET, SRB, SSME status
(Panel)
5/10-11/82 LaRC Aircraft flight safety 	 j
(Davis)	 a
5/18-19/82 MSFC SSME FPL incident
(Himmel)
1
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5/26/82 Headquarters Orbiter capability,
assessment, expendable
launch vehicle, etc.
(Hawkins)
6/10/82 MSFC Filament wound case for
solid rocket motor
(Hedrick)
6/11/82 RI/SD STS structural adequacy
(Hedrick)
6/14-16/82 KSC STS-4 FRR; SPC
discussions & briefing
(Battin, Parmet, Grier
were at SPC & FRR; Davis
at FRR)
6/22-23/82 KSC SSME task force
(Himmel)
6/25/82 KSC FRR	 (Grier)
4/26/82 KSC STS-4, L-2 review
(Grier)
6/30-
7/4/82 JSC Mission control room
STS-4
	
(Davis)
7/7-9/82 DFRC/ARC Aviation Safety	 (Davis)
7/19/82 Michoud Light weight external
Assembly tank	 (Hedrick)
Facility
8/2-5/82 HQ/MSFC Chief Engineer's review
Panel re SRB failure on
STS-4
	 (Himmel)
8/9-13/82 RI/Palmdale Logistics,	 SSME,	 STS &
RI/Downey Orbiter performance
Palmdale operations
(Panel)
8/9/82 DFRC HUD, SIM$ for STS
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missions (Davis)
Discussion on
similarities between
Orbiter & SR 71 landing.
Discussin w/test pilots
at DFRC on landing
characteristics (Davis)
Orbiter TPS (Hawkins)
EVA meeting (Hawkins)
-STS-5,-6 design
certification review
teleconference  (Grier)
HUD, landing gear, crew
egress (Davis, Rothi)
SSME logistics & status
(Elverum & McDonald)
STS-4 anomolies & STS-5
configuration
differences (Parmet)
STS-5 FRR (Grier,
Elverum, Rothi)
SSME Management Overview
Board Meeting (Himmel)
Orbiter; Applicatin of
Airline method-logistics
and spares (McDonald)
Stability and control of
the Orbiter on re-entry
and touchdown (Davis)
Management council
meeting; STS-5; L-2
review (Panel)
Orbiter structures
capabilities (Hawkins,
8/19-20/82	 Ames/LFRC
8/26/82	 ARC
9/13/82	 Headquarters
9/14-15/8?	 RI/Downey
9/16-17/82	 JSC
9/28/82	 Rocketdyne
10/1/82	 Headquarters
10/25/82	 KSC
10/25-27/82	 KSC
11/2/82	 RI/Downey
11/3-4/82	 C. Draper Lab.
11/8-11/82	 KSC
11/22-23/82	 KSC
J
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Hedrick, Cohen)
12/13-14/82
	
KSC	 Technical Readiness
Review for FRF (Roth,
Himmel)
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APPENDIX II
Membership List of the AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL
CHAIRMAN
Mr. Willis M. Hawkins (9/88)*
Senior Advisor
Lockheed Corporaton
P.O. Box 551
Burbank, CA 91520
MEMBERS
Dr. Richard FI. Battin (4/86)
Associate Department Head
Charles Stark Draper Lab, Inc.
555 Technology Square
Cambridge, MA	 02139
Mr. I. Grant Hedrick (11/85)
Presidential Assistant for
Corporate Technology
Grumman Aerospace Corporation
Bethpage, NY	 11714
Lt. Gen. Leighton I. Davis (12/83)
USAF (Ret.)
Consultant
729 Stagecoach Road, Four Hills
Albuquerque, NM	 87123
Mr. Gerard W. Elverum, Jr. (4/88)
Vice President-General Manager
Applied Technology Division
TRW Space and Technology
Redondo Beach, CA	 90278
Mr. John F. McDonald (6/86)
Former Vice President
Techncial Service
TigerAir, Inc.
3000 North Clybourn Avenue
Burbank, CA	 91505
Mr. Norman R. Parmet (3/88)
Consultant
5907 Sunrise Drive
Fairway, KS	 66205
*Appointment terminates (-)
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 Herbert E. Grier (1/85)
	
Mr. John G. Stewart (4/86)
	 j
Consultant	 Assistant General Manager
2223 Avenida de la Playa	 Tennessee Valley Authority
Suite 304
	 400 Commerce Avenue - E12B18
La Jolla, CA	 92037
	
Knoxville, TN	 37902
CONSULTANTS
Dr. Seymour C. Himmel
	
Mr. Robert D. Rothi
12700 Lake Avenue	 6 ^huckwagon Road
Apartment 1501
	
Rolling Hills, CA 90274
Lakewood, OH 44107
EX-OFFICIO MEMBER
Dr. Stanley I. Weiss
NASA Chief Engineer
NASA Headquarters
Washington. DC
STAFF
Mr. Gilbert L. Roth
Staff Director, Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel
NASA Headquarters
Washington, DC 20546
A/C 202 755-8381
Ms. Susan Webster
Advisory Committee Assistant
NASA Hdqrs Code LB-4
Washington, DC 20546
A/C 202 755-8380
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BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR
LIGHT WEIGHT EXTERNAL TANK
ASSESSMENT
Discussion
The shell structure should be able to maintain its structural
integrity, i.e., not collapse or rupture, at values of loads up
to some safe value (called ultimate load) above the maximum
expected operational load (called limit, load). Thg ratio
ultimate load/limit load is called factor of safety (F.S.). A
factor of safety is used to provide protection against
uncertainties in load, material properties, manufacturing
variations, etc.
The F.S. in general use for aircraft is 1.5. An F.S. of 1.4
was adopted for general use in design and certification of the
STS, and the HWT was designed for an F.S. of 1.4. For the LWT
the F.S. was reduced to 1.25 for loads categorized as
"steady-state" or "well defined." The original F.S. of 1.4 was
retained for loads categorized as "dynamic" or "all other". The
composite F.S. equals 1.265 in the critical design condition for
LH 2 tank shell buckling.
HWT Static Strength Test - The HWT was static tested in the
MSFC vertical test stand in 1979. The critical test areas were
submerged in liquid hydrogen so that material strength properties
would be the same as in actual operating conditions. The LH2
section of the HWT was pressurized to 32 psi, which is the lower
limit of flight pressurization (the lower limit is critical for
shell buckling). The maximum level of Orbiter thrust load
applied is uncertain since it is reported as 113.5 percent of
limit in one part of the test report and 130 percent in another
part of the same report (MMC-ET-TM03-0, Volume III, "External
1
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Tank LH 2
 Strength Test Report). The WIT test specimen did not
show any signs of distress at the load levels imposed.
LWT Static Test for Buckling - A Limit load verification test
was run on LWT-2 in the horizontal proof test stand at Martin
Marietta's Michoud, Louisiana, plant. Gaseous nitrogen at room
temperature was used in the LH 2 section to provide an internal
pressure 23 psi greater than ambient. The 23 psi differential
pressure was held constant while external loads were applied to
produce the "equivalent"1/ of 100 percent design limit axial load
in integral skin/stringer shell at the area2/
that was predicted by analysis to be most critical for panel
buckling.
1/"Equivalent" is used 'here to indicate that the design limit
load was reduced to account for the reduced modulus of elasticity
of the 2219-T87 aluminum material at room temperature compared to
the operating temperature of -423oF, i.e., loads are divided by
the factor (12.4 X 10 6 )/10.8 X 10 6 ) = 1.1
2/"The STAGS-C analysis by Martin Marietta indicated that the
minimum margins for compressive buckling occurred at the 10:30
and 1:30 o'clock positions at Station 1702.
This test was carefully run so as not to exceed the local design
limit stress. Because the internal pressure, which is
stabilizing, was only 23 psi rather than the minimum operational
value of 32 psi, it is estimated that the test demonstrated
approximately 109% of limit load or 119% (i.e., 1.09 x 109) at
rated power level of the main engines. It provides no margin to
cover any variation in load or variation in strength. It is
ORIGINAL
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unlikely that all LWT's will have strengths greater than LWT-2.
LWT Proof (or Acceptance) Test - In addition to the static
test for buckling just described, which was performed on LWT-2
only, each production LWT receives a burst proof test as an
acceptanc e test. These acceptance tests are run in the
horizontal test stand facility at the Martin Marietta plant at
Michoud, Louisiana. The acceptance test is designed to impose the
"equivalent"1/ of 105 percent of limit load tension on all welds.
The internal pressure alone is sufficient to proof load the axial
welds, but five different combinations external loads are used in
addition to the internal pressure to attain the proper loads on
the circumferential welds, This proof test contributes nothing
toward the verification of required compressive buckling strength
of the LH 2 tank shell.
1/ 1'Equivalent" is used here to indicate that the proof
pressure was reduced to account for the reduced toughness of the
2219-T87 aluminum material at room temperature compared to the
operating temperature of -423oF, i.e., pressures are divided by
the factor 1.1. Since the high side of the flight ullage
pressure regulation band is 34 psia and the LH 2 under flight
acceleration is 5.4 psi then the proof pressure
P(proof) = (40.4 X 1.05)/1.1 = 38.6 psig
50
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STABILITY OF SPACE SHUTTLE EXTERNAL LIGHT WEIGHT TANK (LWT)
David Bushnell and Bo Almroth
ABSTRACT
The next and future launches of the Space Shuttle will include a
redesign external (disposable) tank. This tank is of lighter
weight than that used to date. It has been tested to design
limit load, not to ultimate load. During a certain phase of the
launch there are regions of the tank subjected to destabilizing
loads generated by the thrust of the Orbiter engines. Recently,
the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, a committee that advises
NASA Headquartes on issues involving the Space Shuttle, expressed
concern about the adequacy of the new design with regard to
buckling. The committee recommended that experts in the field of
shell buckling be called in to evaluate the new design, render an
opinion of safety, and make recommendations about possible
further analyses and tests. David Bushnell and Bo Almroth were
selected by the Panel and by NASA Headquarters to perform these
tasks. On December 9th and 10th Bushnell and Almroth visited the
Martin Marietta Compbny, Michoud Division, New Orleans, in order
to evaluate the light weight tank design with regard to buckling.
On December llth they, representatives from Martin Marietta, the
Aerospace Safety Advisory t.enel, and NASA officials met at NASA
Headquarters to discuss tt buckling issue. As a result of
Bushnell's and Almroth's evaluations, it was decided that the
light weight tank could be flown on the next Shuttle launch
without further analysis, but that nonlinear analyses with the
use of the STAGSC-1 computer program should be performed with an
eye toward future launches, during which the destabilizing loads
are expected to be somewhat higher than those on the next flight.
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NASA HEADQUARTERS, SPACE SHUTTLE OFFICE:
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Mike Weeks, Jerry Fitts, Dave Winterhalter, Raoul Lopez
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Jim Kingsbury and others
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Willis Hawkins, Chairman of NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel (213) 847-6623
Grant Hedrick, VP Grumman (516) 565-3506, Member of Aerospace
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Gilbert Roth, Staff Director, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel,
NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC 20546 (202) 755-8380
Nathaniel B. Cohen, Stanley Weiss
MARTIN-MARIETTA. COMPANY:
MICHOUD DIVISION, NEW ORLEANS:
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255-3920
Dick Foll, Director Engrg. Martin Michoud, (504) 255-3015
Ben Groninger
Jon Dutton, Mgr. Mechanical Engrg. Martin-Michoud, (504)
255-3666
Dale Karr, Engineer-Analyst, Martin-Michoud, (504) 255-3680
Gale Copeland, Bob Mann
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Buckling expert	 ( 415) 858--4927
Ir	
j
f
ORIGINAL PAGE 13
Or POOR QUA' LITY	
54
BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM DEFINITIONS
On Wednesday, November 24, 19$2, Willis Hawkins, in his
capacity as chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel for
NASA's Space Shuttle program, telephoned David Bushnell about a
knuckling issue in the Space Shuttle external tank. Hawkins asked
Bushnell to call Grant HedH ck for details. That afternoon,
Bushnell, Almroth, and Hedrick held a telephone conference in
which Hedrick defined the issue.
Figure 1 shows the Space Shuttle external tank (ET). At a
certain phase of operation following launch, local regions of
axial compression develop just forward r longerons by means of
which Orbiter thrust loads are transferred to the external tank.
In this region the external tank, which contains liquid hydrogen
and is internally pressurized to 32 psi, must be designed so that
it will not buckle under the combined hoop tension and axial
compression. The tank is stiffened internally by stringers with
T--shaped cross sections, L, shown in Figure 3. (First two rings
in the foreground are typical.)
On Spare Shuttle flights to date the disposable external tank
has and an inert weight of 7100 pounds. This tank, henceforth
called "heavy weight tank" (HWT) or "standard weight tank," (SWT),
was tested under cryogen's;: conditions to an ultimate load of 1.40
times design limit load. Because of the need to reduce weight, a
new lighter weight disposable tank has been designed, henceforth
called "light weight tank" (LWT), with an inert weight of 60500
pounds. About half of the weight saving came from structure; the
skin between stringers was reduced in thickness in certain areas,
the cross sections of certain rings were reduced, and material
was taken out of the aft portion of the large longerons by means
of which orbital thrust loads are transferred to the LH 2 tank.
t"
	 The new light weight tank has been tested to design limit
^Db'D^Dav^`1 ►^  ^^'1^^^ fig+
OF POOR QUAI,D Y
55
load in the horizontal proof test stand at Martin Marietta's
Michoud, Louisiana, plant. A new definition of ultimate load,
1.25 times design limit load, has been accepted. Buckling
analyses conducted at Martin Michoud by bale Karr indicate that
the new tank will withstand the new ultimate load, The new tank
will fly on the next launch, how planned for January, and on
future Shuttle flights.
Due to the pressures of time and money there is currently no
plan to test the new tank to the new ultimate load. This lack of
a test on a stability-critical structure designed to a lower
margin over design limit and than the previous tested tank
worried Hedrick. Accordingly, as a member of the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel, he advised that an independent evaluation of the
analysis methods and the new design with regard to buckling be
carried out. Bushnell and Almroth were consulted as experts in
this field.
After the telephone conference wit!. Hedrick, Bushnell called
Hawkins on November 24 to request that Hawkins officially
introduce Bushnell and Almroth to whoever at Martin Michoud has
overall responsibility for the structural integrity of the
Shuttle external tank. Bushnell and Almroth would then gather
enough data from Martin in order to render an opinion.
On Friday, December 3 Gil Roth at NASA Headquarters contacted
Bushnell at Lockheed. Roth requested that Bushnell contact Al
Norton at Martin Michoud to set up a visit by Bushnell and
Almroth on Decemer 9th and 10th at Martin in order to
;i
R
	
	 learn details of the geometry and buckling analysis conducted at
Martin. Bushnell first called Norton, who directed him to Dick
Foll. Foll knew about the proposed visit to Martin by Almroth
and Bushnell; he was agreeable to the
-;	 g	 proposed dates of the
kk
	 visit; and he supplied the name, Jon Dutton, manager of the
k4=
department reponsible for the analysis of the Shuttle external
`r	 tank. Bushnell called Dutton in order to obtain certain details
56
of geometry and loading that would permit some analysis to be
conducted at Lockheed with PANDA, BOSOR4, and possibly STAGSC-1
before the visit on December 9th and 10th. These details were
supplied to Bushnell on Friday afternoon, December 3 by Dale
Karr.
Following the telephone contacts at Martin Michoud, Bushnell
called Roth at NASA Headquarters to confirm the dates of Almroth
and Bushnell's visit to Martin. Roth told Bushnell that there
would be a meeting at NASA Headquarters on Saturday, December 11,
in General Abrahamson's office to discuss the buckling issue and
to learn the opinions of Almroth and Bushnell. This meeting
would be attended by General Abrahamson, Gil Roth, Willis
Hawkins, Grant Hedrick, Al Norton, Dick Foll, Jon Dutton, Bo
Almroth, David Bushnell, people from NASA Marshall Space Flight
Center (MSFC), and others.
On Friday, December 3 and Monday and Tuesday, December 6 and
7, Bushnell conducted buckling analyses of the local regions of
the Shuttle external tank subjected to compressive stresses.
PANDA and BOSOR4 runs were made. Results from these two programs
agree with each other for cases in which both apply. A
preliminary conclusion, from the data supplied by Dale Karr over
the telephone and from PANDA and BOSOR4 calculations based on
these data k is that the new, lighter weight Shuttle external tank
has sufficient margin with regard to buckling.
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APPENDIX IV
MAIN ENGINE
^j
September 29, 1982
i
TO:	 Willis M. Hawkins
FROM:	 Jerry Elverum and John McDonald
SUBJECT: NASA-ASAP Visit to Rocketdyne to Examine SSME Logistics
and Support, September 28th
As noted in Gil Roth's memo of August 18th (page 2) we visited
Rocketdyne, Canoga Park, to review the logistics and support
aspects pertinent to the SSME. A detailed presentation was given
to us and two copies (BC 82-223) have been sent by Rocketdyne
directly to Gil Roth. The program was divided into two main
parts:
(a) turn-around operations and maintenance together
with support systems, and
(b) an outline of the precepts upon which the support
activities are being based.
Vince Wheelock (SSME Logistics Manager) presented part "a" and
his Chief of Schedule Management, Harvey Colbo, gave part "b". A
copy of the Rocketdyne organization chart is attached hereto
(attachment 1). Persons also attending are listed in attachment
2
These notes will include a discursive commentary upon the
material presented to us, together with selected charts, and will
conclude with some more specific recommendations of a form
suitable for adaptation to the ASAP annual report.
i
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MATERIAL PRESENTED AND DISCUSSION
Opening comments were that flight data were being continuously
analyzed for maintenance action but it was conceded that there
were Just not enough data available yet from the four flight to
refine the assumptions made - really prior to STS-1. It was
stated that thee studies really commenced in the definition phase
beginning in 1972 and used extensive Saturn experince background.
External visual inspections on the SSME were described followed
by the turbopump breakway torque and axial shaft travel
pre-flight checks. Internal inspections of the entire powerhead
assembly and the main combustion chamber were outlined - these
consisting principally of borescope ports using both fibre-optic
and rigid borescopes. Camera (35 mm) shots can be taken in some
cases - mostly with rigid borescope applications. Drying purge
of the combustion chamber and various leak checks were described
including checks with throat plugs installed.
Electrical checks look fairly straightforward, probably the least
familiar to mechanics being controller memory read-out. All the
preceding checks are accomplished with the Orbiter in the
horizontal position but some, such as high-pressure fuel
turbopump removal are time consuming tasks as the unit has to be
disconnected from its ducts etc., and slid out on "Thompson
rails" (a piece of GSE) every second flight.
The Rocketdyne team at KSC to accomplish all this seems to number
about 35 men, about half of whom are involved on each shift in
the pre-launch activities. Some 13 technicians, 4 inspectors and
2 or 3 engineers are normally required but like all critical
borescope viewing techniques the "Mark I eye-ball" confidence
will probably be placed in just one or two men who possess great
experience. This connotes a critical training problem as launch
rates increase.
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Readiness maintenance tests with the whole Shuttle assembly on
the launch pad were described and a few unscheduled maintenance
items have been identified. Environmental protection sets
(covers) for the SSME and for the RCS and OMS engine were
described, but their installation after landing is rather
difficult and time consuming because of the height from the
ground. More specifically, only three sets exist at present -
one at KSC and the other being available to be ferriea to White
Sands, Hickam, Kadena, Rota or Dakar as the abort case might be.
The SSME's would have to be removed to provide ferry range-weight
capability out of Dakar, Hickam and Kadena.
When the craft is on the launch pad at KSC the availability of
only one set of SSME GSE means that each engine at the present
time has to be worked on in series. it apparently takes six
shifts or approximately 48 elapsed hours to remove the old engine
and install the new. The usual supporting logistics analyses
including resources such as facilities, maintenance crews,
training, spares, handbooks and manuals etc. appear to have been
well thought out and are based upon a DOD philosophy - e.g.,
organizational, intermediate and depot levels and a maintenance
plan has been established to suit. Training manuals have been
prepared and courses planned.
MTBR studies have been made of all principle components and
a
assemblies and,engine overhauls have been scheduled based largely
upon these values. Support of this wide base of materiel was
said to be "in the short term" based upon existing vendors'
facilities and production * units whereas, "in the long term" it
would revolve around "dedicated facilities and systems." The
terms were not defined in years and we drew the conclusion,
erroneous perhaps, that they were feeling their way both in terms
of experience with the flight hardware and available funding
downstream.
__ - -.9
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The all-components total MTBR plots for the period 1970 through
1980 based upon test stand data and earlier similar engine data
are shown in attached Chart C-9 and Rocketdyne expressed
confidence in the conservatism of these based upon their approach
of factoring the MTBR value. Chart C-9 shows this overall engine
f
life growth plotted upon a linear scale. C-10 shows the major
r	
components of the engine and the asymptotic sections beyond FY
0 84 are intended to indicate that they don't expect to gain a
great deal of data above the fully certificated (and realized)
life level. it is of significance that the most crucial
components, namely the HPFTP and the HPOTP are at the bottom of
the totem pole, while the LPFTP and the LPOTP are not really very
much better. Much of this is due to the actual experience over
the foul flights and the higher FPL involved. Chart C-34 shows
the estimated data replotted from October 1980 to Octoer 1981
resulting, in effect, in a zero gain in MTBR throughtout that
period. In fact, the plot shows a somewhat retrograde trend but
the dotted line reflects optimism which, in our opinion, may not
be fuly justified. Even if the life growth rates shown in C-35
are realized the effect upon available SSME spares levels could
well be serious and some launches could suffer delay. The
following plots (Charts C-36 through C-41) indicate the same
optimism and C-38 and C-39 for the HPFTP and the HPOTP
respectively should be examined carefully. There appears to be
little justification for the revised "projected improvement"
dotted line.
Taking the foregoing a little further and examining Chart C-52 it
will be seen that the overhaul projections are rather awkwardly
"bunched" especially circa 1993-1994. Rocketdyne believe that
the natural occurrences of failures and other aberrations will
tend to minimize some of the "bunching" and this may well prove
to be true, but it is an uncomfortable precept with which to
start the program. The last Chart, C-53, summarizes the
expressed confidence level in terms of the halved MTBR
assumptions. The principal conclusion we drew upon the basis of
i
t64	 1
the data presented is that additional spare SSME's or at least a
larger spares float of hi-1-6 and low pressure oxygen, and fuel
turbopumps would provide some better insurance:.
rC'
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RECOMMENDATIONS (tot the Shuttle program)
1. The MTBR analyses, while appearing to be very thorough in
classical reliability study terms and rendered conservative
by the "two times factor," do ;not appear to be in consort
with the spectrum of early removals being experienced in the
program to date. A comprehensive " best case - worst case"
analysis should be considered covering the full range of
reasonably possible contingencies, especially in the
logistics and supply fields.
2. Results to date with a wide variety of "random failure"
induced problems on the SSME indicate that the four pumps
are likely to have MTRR I s well below ori g inal expectations -
at least for the next year or two. The high pressue fuel
turbopump and the high pressure oxygen turbopump appear to
be especially critical because of the limited spares
available and the long lead times involved in procurement.
Additional spare units would appear very desirable.
3. Planned grouping of the SSME overhauls should be re-examined
to see if they could be more uniformly distributed over the
period 1984 through 1994. While it is most likely that
unforeseen incidents will affect the planned dispersion and
tend to improve it, the present layout would appear to be
prone to loss of overhaul technical skills in the workload
"valley" periods and thus will run counter to safety and
reliability requirements.
d
4. "Near term" support based purely upon " robbing" production
hardware and placing reliance upon the vendors fc.r overhaul
and other technial service should be critically analyzed.
The "near term" and "long term" time spans should be defined
and very conscious steps taken toward the establishment of a
properly based "dedicated overhaul facility," not the least
QRICINAL PW' E iR
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important of which will be the average age and experience
level of the technicians employed. Employment stability and
continuity is also an important factor in this respect.
5.	 From the overall safety and reliability viewpoints every
possible effort should be made in planning to avoid
dependence upon "cannibalizing," or robbing from production
lines to meet flight date requirements. Such continuing
support pressures Inevitably run counter to safety because
of the desire to adjust "red line," extend the life for just
one more mission, and so on, to preserve intact the very
expensive and highly publicly visible launch date schedules.
RECOMMENDATIONS (for the NASA-ASAP group)
It became clear in the course of the excellent Rocketdyne SSME
presentation that the engine and related systems are much too
highly specialized - and spread over too narrow a base in terms
of the four Orbiter vehicles - to permit any other group than
Rocketdyne to accomplish the overhaul and support tasks - or even
for that matter, the critical pre-flight inspections. Further,
it became more apparent at each logistics and support ptesentaton
that if we, as a Panel, are to really understand the enormity of
this task and to make valid suggestions, we have to spend much
more time on visits and studies. Certainly the somewhat
intangible, but never-the-less real, eftects of logistics and
support philosophies upon overall system safety warrant turther
attention.
cc: Parmet	 Attachment 1. Rocketdyne Organization Chart
Grier	 2. Attendance list
Himmel	 3. Selected presentation charts
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John F. McDonald NASA (ASP) 843-8311
Jerry Elve UM ( S W) 535-2374
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APPLNDiX V
NOTES ON RELATIOINSHIPS OF SHUTTLE
PROGRAM TO COMMERCIAL AIRLINE LOGISTICS
1. INTRODUCTION
Now that STS-5 has been completed and with OV-099's first
flight drawing near, some of the potential problems in
logistics, spares and support can be viewed in somewhat
clearer perspective. This rather rambling and discursive
commentary represents some observations made in the light of
extensive airline experience, both in operating and design
fields. Some viewponts are undoubtedly contentious and
represent only the writer's opinions and not necessarily
those of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel as a whole.
As in an airline, the relationship of overall safety to
logistics and maintenance for a continuously operating
Shuttle fleet is absolutely central. It is perhaps more so
because the national prestige and multi-million dollar
business commitments to established launch dates make it
imperative that these will be met in a planned and orderly
support manner, rather than by "cannibalizing" and borrowing
from the production line. At the extreme end of this
launch-at-any-cost spectrum would be the unwise extension of
major component overhaul life or the expedient adjustment of
operating "red lines."
At some point there must be a transition from the traditional
NASA R&D mode to a rational operational pattern but there can
be little comparison to that of a safe and successful
airline. Some of the issues in these differences will be
discussed later, but the major paradox in the Shuttle program
appears to be that maximum utilization, amounting to a
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projected twenty-two day turn-around (Ref.l) will occur circa
1990 when many of the support and supply sources will have
dried up. Even in the so-called " near term" there is an
obvious paucity of airframe and engine spares, exacerbated by
the unique nature of the components and the lengthy lead
times en'^.ailed in ordering and manufacturing them.
2. THE SMALL FLEET
The fleet size of four Orbiter (or five if OV-105 is ever
funded) is such that, if any comparison to airline terms were
possible, a fleet of say four B-147 aires:aft would be
considered impractical £ror• the economic viewpoint. About
the only way in which such an	 _fl eet could be made
acceptable from the maintenance and support viewponns would
be to become a hypothetical part of a larger carrier's fleet
of B-747's and to "piggy-back" on those maintenance programs.
Obviously nothing of the sort is applicable to the Shuttle
programand the airline-Shuttle comparison therefore becomes
somewhat academic and misleading. There are, however, some
airlinfl control and management techniques which could
probably be transplanted with advantage.
Small airline fleets of large, specialized aircraaft depend
heavily upon spares pooling arrangements, common engine and
major component overhaul facilities, and the like. They have
a grand common denominator with other carriers ire that the
prime manufacturer obtains, resolves and distributes
maintenance operating data - especially safety related issues
- from all sources. This is reinforced by the regulatory
activ ; ties of the FAA and thus there are probably more
"checks and balances" than could ever be possible with the
nature of the Shuttle program. Consequently it would appear
that the tightest overall program management control possible
will only be just good enough for the Shuttle in the absence
of some of the advantages cited.
1
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3. THE DPTAIL DIFFERENCES IN VEHICLES
One of the inherent problems of a fleet of vehicles which are
almost alike is that it requires special vigilance to avoid
the mistakes of apparent maintenance familiarity. For
example, in the case of an actual B-747 fleet of the writer's
acquaintance there are now, in seventeen aircraft no less
than five gross, landing and zero fuel weight combinations,
four different engine configurations (all Pratt & 'Whitney),
four different cockpit layouts and it is difficult to find
more than two aircraft for which you could use the same
wiring diagram manual. The moral to this story is that it is
infinitely m• a difficult to manage systems which ,+,re almost
alike and this canard applies equally to the four Orbiter
OV-099, 102, 103 and 104.
Comprehensive individual wiring manuals are essential, rather
than recourse to masses of blueprints to unravel the
differences at the flight line or launch pad level. This
will become a sine qua non around say 1990 when some of the
continuity of the devoted cadre of experts has disappeared
through attrition and retirement. Economies in maintenance
publications now will reap their own negative reward later,
but a format like the airlines' universal ATA Spec. 100
series offers geat flexibility in permitting the operators
to do their own revisions without the requirement for off-set
printing.
4. THE INABILITY TO "BORROW" SPARES
One of the interesting characteristics of large commercial
oarriers is that, while competing intensively on the traffic
route and fare structure fronts, they do, in general,
co-operate with each other to a remarkable degree on the
maintenance and engineering fronts. The IATP (International
Airlwne Tephnical Parts Pool) system, initially organized
r
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under IATA airline auspices, is a good example of this highly
developed interchange system but its roots are, of course,
in the degree of common units and parts between each of the
carriers, including the use of each other's engines upon
specified rental and return agreement terms. Clearly no such
advantages are possible with the unique nature of almost
all of the functional system component's of the Orbiter and
its supporting ground systems, but the purpose of this
recital of the obvious is to avoid the danger of making
logistics and spares support comparisons which are
significantly influenced by airline techniques.
Airline methodology has certainly some lessons which could be
of value to the Shuttle program but in this instance it is;
more likely that military techniques (shorn of some of their
traditional overbuying excesses) would provide a better
model. The comparatively leisurely utilization rates (in
peacetime) would seem to provide a more accurate counterpart
from the specific viewpoint of spares, although the length of
the supply lines for the Shuttle involve a great deal of
expedited special air transport methods - especially critical
as turn-around time become shorter.
5. THE SLOW RATE OF MATURING (LOW UTILIZATION)
Since the fleet base of the Orbiters is so small, and the
rate of accumulation of hours and cycles so slow it may well
be that the entire system will barely attain real maturity
co-incident with obsolescence. This problem is intensified
by the very low number of test hours compared with the
development of a commercial airline and particularly by the
absence of a broad "service test" phase among many different
operators all around the world. Even so, commercial airlines
occasionally suffer disastro-us problems at a stage when it
ORIGINAL PACT ES	
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would be reasonable to assume that the entire structure and
functional systems had reached maturity. There is also the
reverse situation to attaining maturity in which increasing
age has uncovered unexpected problems necessitating major
remedial programs especially in structural aspects.
Maturity of the SSME will probably be interrupted by the use
of progressively increasing power levels necessitated by
payload demands. Any support program should guard against
excessive optimism in terms of anticipated and uninterrupted
linear development of MTBR and MTBF values. The HPOTP and
the HPFTP pumps are especially critical in view of their
extraordinarily high performance with respect to material
temperature limits and operating margins. The complete
engine test stand facilities offer few alternatives in the
event of damage due to an uncontained failure, which, it
would seem statistically is likely to happen with the number
of engines in the entire program through, say, the year 1990.
6„ THE UNEVEN PREDICTED WEAR-OUT POINTS
The multiplicity of functional components in the Orbiter are
at least double and probably closer to triple those in a
large commercial transport aircraft. A large proportion of
these are of brand new design and ?t is going to be extremely
difficult to rationalize the preventive maintenance programs
in terms of MTBR and MTBF to suit. A sophisticated aircraft
like the Lockheed L-1011 would probably provide the beat
comparison but even so most of the functional system 	 A
components in this case are derivatives of earlier designs
and thus there has been a broad historical base upon which to
predict an initial maintenance program which could be
acceptable to the FAA's MRB - Maintenance Review Board - see
Ref. 1) at the outset of operations.
`ro achieve an equivalent degree of confidence at the
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commencement; of Shuttle operations is plainly not possible
but the vital nature of this data foundation gleaning every
piece of experience, test and early u ge information in a
collective and systematic way for the entire system - would
appear to be imperative especially in view of production lead
times and batch size impoverishment. The magnitude of the
task of producing comprehensive FMEA's (failure modes and
effects analysis) for all critical components may result in
an encyclopedic paper analysis which will be completed too
late tot economic supplies re-ordering. The judicious use of
actual flight-line experience rather than somewhat abstract
analyses should therefore be encouraged and some spares
procurement gambles made as a form of insurance for the
1990's. Obviously the MEA's for the selected list of
critical high-value components must be completed first.
7. DATA FEED-BACK FROM OPERATO R TO PRIME
The mechanism of operating experience data feed-back from the
Shuttle operations groups to the prime manufacturers warrants
some discussion insofar as it relationship to an airline is
concerned. In the airline case the aircra-ft: manufacturer not
only collects all his own data from his resident
representative upon airframe problems but also acts as a
"clearing house" for information on all significant vendor
component problems. Some of the larger vendors also have
their own representatives at the main airline base. This
information chain is constantly endorsed by a lively defect
reporting system produced by the airline itself and the whole
process is enforced by the sometimes unwelcome attention of
the FAA who have their own series of safety related
directives and reports.
Pare'.lels of some of the above do not appear to exist in the
Shuttle program but, on the other hand,esome of the liaison
engineering procedures are probably more closely coupled,
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especially in the R&D phase. The presence of such large
groups of contractor personnel at KSC, for example, at every
launch has no parallel in commercial airline operation. in
the a i rline case a small introductory team of factory experts
is invariably stationed at the main M & E base for the first
few months. These groups include personnel who can help
establish the entire maintenance and overhaul programs for
the airline operators and assist in securing FAA operating
approval if necessary.
Since NASA and the prime contractors appear to act as their
own "police force" - there being no counterpart of the FAA -
the overall perspective of data reporting requirements may
not be as clear as in the commerical airline case. This will
be especially true when the craft have been in operation for
a decade or more and are considered to be a "mature system."
The danger of dedicated channels of information from the
larger prime contactor contingents at Kennedy and Vandenberg
for the rather exclusive use (even if unintentionally) of the
principal factory always exists in a program wherein the
manufacturer-operator relationships are manifestly
incestuous.
8. THE SPC PHILOSOPHY - STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
The Shuttle Processing Contract philosophy now being
developed deserves some comment, particularly because, as a
concept it has arrived rather late in the day. It is probably
unlikely to save money as opposed to leaving the processing
activities in the hands of knowledgeable and responsible
prime contractors. What it can do is to try to makeup for
some of the inherent shortcomings of such a small-fleet-base
R&D pattern but it must consciously avoid the danger of
internecine warfare, especially in information channels. It
would appear that since the transfer of experience of the
launch techniques must inevitably involve the acquisition of
1
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some key personnel, there would perforce be some "pirating,"
at KSC in particular. Perhaps this would be necessary
eventually in any case to permit NASA to disengage itself
progressively from its all-absorbing Shuttle role and move on
to other programs.
The greatest inherent weakness in the SPC approach seems to
revolve around the extraordinarily specialized nature of the
Orbiter and the learning curve issues which are germane
thereto. Equipment knowledge and overhaul repair techniques
and facilities.- are so specialized and unique that it would
seem to be impractical, for example, to.ever _ subcontract the
support of the SSME's to any group other than Rocketdyne (see
Ref. 3). There must be other crucial systems in the orbiter
of the same nature, that is to say, cases in which attempts
to transfer authority for apparent contractual advantage
would prove unproductive.
9. SUSTAINING ENGINEERING
The somewhat euphemistic term "sustaining engineering" seems
to embrace a combination of the function of what the airlines
know generically as "engineering" and the manufacturer as
"customer support" -- or at least the in-service modification
and development engineering aspects of support. The tendency
among the larger trunk airlines today is to reduce their own
airline engineering activities (reductions from approximately
150 persons to 35-50 during the past three or four years
being not uncommon) and depend more heavily upon the
manutacturer's support engineering services. Top airline
management personnel are now more frequently of a legal or
financial persuasion and the era of major influence of the
key engineering pe; ;. Q ity has gone (see Ref, 4) .
Consequently the 1^kelih>od of bigger airlines doing their
own corrective engineering re-design, as was the case in the
earn post rAW II period has d^.sappeared upon economic
n a ^,
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grounds, and the situation may have some sort of
applicability to the Shuttle program.
To the outside observer of the Shuttle program it appears
that a degree of investigative engineering is being done on
both sides of the house - NASA and the prime contractors.
In the present R&D phase this is undoubtedly the right course
to pursue but when NASA eventually moves into being the
operator it would appear logical to keep the corrective
engineering responsibility squarely with the prime
manufacturer (if their prices aren't too impossibly high!).
This field of "sustaining engineering" will be in need of
careful delineation of interface relationships under the SPC
concept to avoid duplication of responsibilities or worse,
abdication.
The commercial transport aircraft is in reality a very
complex and therefore imperfect machine made practical to
great extent by the skills of the mechanics and technicians
who maintain them. This is rz.<<s: true to a somewhat lesser
extent for military aircraft, buZ. since the design is almost
never optimum the maintenance and operational people have to
circumvent the shortcomings by ingenuity and adaptability - a
process sometimes known rather grandly as "the learning
curve." It is frequently true that there is not, and should
not be, a solution to every problem by redesign. Indeed, the
smaller the vehicle fleet basis the less practical it is to
start upon a redesign in cases where operator ingenuity could
alternatively solve the problem. In short, "sustaining
engineering" activities should be examined and re-examined
and where they have no effect upon safety they should be
reviewed through the "pay-back criterion" bearing in mind
that nine-tenths of all cos'-effectiveness justifications of
this type are illusory in the full term.
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10. SUMMARIZING COMMENT
If one should be unwise enough to try to summarize Such
admittedly unsupported impressions as the foregoing, the
encapsulation would be something like the following. If
nothing else some of the points might provide stimulus for
future discussion.
a. The Shuttle program does not appear to-have the amount
of spares that an airline would require at a comparable
period in the opeational development of a new fleet.
b. It would appear that, due to the specialized and unique
nature of the Shuttle program more, rather than less
spares would be needed, than for an airline.
C.	 The maintenance publication programs must not be
curtailed as a cost-saving expedient - othewise we shall
pay for it later in continuous delays and possibly
safety.
d. An overall maintenance control program covering all
aspects of Shuttle program including the entire
propulsion system along the lines of an FAA Maintenance
Review Board should be prepared.
e. The Shuttle Processing Contract concept is already late
and it it is not to be implemented until the end of 1983
some irrecoverable lead time will be lost.
Al^^rnatively, some expedient gambles on spares
procurement should be taken by the existing channels now
to reduce cannibalization and borrowing from the
production line.
--I
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APPENDIX V11
Mt. Willis M. Hawkins	 September 13, 1982
Senior Advisor
Lockheed Corporation
Rutbank, CA 91520
ML. James M. Beggs
Administrator NASA
Washington, DC	 20546
Dear Jim:
During one of the past meetings you asked the Aerospace Safety
Panel to review the safety aspects of flight operations at the
NASA Centers. Lee Davis of the ASAP accepted the assignment
and has now visited Langley, JSC, Ames, and DFRF. His
recommendations are as follows:
a. Walter Williams addressed this subject in March. His
recommendations are sound and should be implemented,
specifically:
(1) Headquarters NASA should update and issue Management
Instructions 7910.1 and 7910.2. (The ASAP would be
happy to review drafts before official issue.)
(2) The Intercenter Operations Group (ICOG), consisting of
the flight operations chiefs should be reconstituted and
meet quarterly to exchange information on operational
and flight safety problems.
(3) Flight Safety should be recognized as a distinct
discipline and experienced pilots should be assigned to
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assist the Flight Operations Chief at each Center in
fulfilling his safety responsibilities.
(4) Flight Test Engineering should be a distinct and
official function at the Research and Engineering
Centers. Regardless of the character and duration of
any flight program, plans and schedules should be drawn
up, preferably by Flight Test Engineering, and appoved
by approprite levels of management.
b. There should be greater exchange of flight safety related
information between the operations branches of the Centers.
This could be a function of the ICOG, (2) above. An example,
JSC has had several flameouts (some dual) in T-38
operations. Some weeks late DFRF which operates a T-38,
had not heard of the problem, or its solution.
c. Line management should be certain the,t flight safety issues
are brought to their attention # and decisions thereon are
not based on personalities. Example: The Flight Operations
Chief at JSC had recommended a policy forbidding nonstop
flights from the Cape to Ellington in T-38s. (Sound
reasons: limited range, flameout problems, weather and
congestion in the Houston area.) JSC management over-ruled,
apparently influenced by the opinions of some of the
astronauts.
Davis feels that flight operations at the Centers are in the
hands of competent experienced managers. It is clear that
the functin of Flight Test Engineering with its planning and
judgment inputs would enhance safety margins if the
responsibility of assessing risks were assigned to such an
organization by Flight Operations managers. Lee Davis
specifically commends that suggestion of Williams to your
attention. His overall attitude is that no apparent
immediate hazards exist but inconsistencies from Base to
Base and too-long familiarity with past practices suggest
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that new emphasis
sincere follow—up.
Very sincerely yours,
Willis M. Hawkins, Chairman
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
from Headquarters is imperative a
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